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Abstract
Anomalies in online social networks can signify irregular, and often illegal behaviour. Detection of such anomalies
has been used to identify malicious individuals, including spammers, sexual predators, and online fraudsters. In this
paper we survey existing computational techniques for detecting anomalies in online social networks. We characterise
anomalies as being either static or dynamic, and as being labelled or unlabelled, and survey methods for detecting these
different types of anomalies. We suggest that the detection of anomalies in online social networks is composed of two
sub-processes; the selection and calculation of network features, and the classification of observations from this feature
space. In addition, this paper provides an overview of the types of problems that anomaly detection can address and
identifies key areas for future research.
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1. Introduction
Anomalies arise in online social networks as a conse-
quence of particular individuals, or groups of individuals,
making sudden changes in their patterns of interaction or
interacting in a manner that markedly differs from their
peers. The impacts of this anomalous behaviour can be
observed in the resulting network structure. For example,
fraudulent individuals in an online auction system may
collaborate to boost their reputation. Because these indi-
viduals have a heightened level of interaction, they tend
to form highly interconnected subregions within the net-
work (Pandit et al., 2007). In order to detect this type
of behaviour, the structure of a network can be examined
and compared to an assumed or derived model of nor-
mal, non-collaborative interaction. Regions of the network
whose structure differs from that expected under the nor-
mal model can then be classified as anomalies (also known
as outliers, exceptions, abnormalities, etc.).
In recent times, the rise of online social networks and
the digitisation of many forms of communication has meant
that online social networks have become an important part
of social network analysis (SNA). This includes research
into the detection of anomalies in social networks, and
numerous methods have now been developed. This de-
velopment has occurred over a wide range of problem do-
mains, with anomaly detection being applied to the de-
tection of important and influential network participants
(e.g. Shetty and Adibi (2005); Malm and Bichler (2011);
Cheng and Dickinson (2013)), clandestine organisational
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structures (e.g. Shetty and Adibi (2005); Krebs (2002);
Reid et al. (2005)), and fraudulent and predatory activ-
ity (e.g. Phua et al. (2010); Fire et al. (2012); Chau et al.
(2006); Akoglu et al. (2013); Pandit et al. (2007)).
Since anomaly detection is coming to play an increas-
ingly important role in SNA, the purpose of this paper is
to survey existing techniques, and to outline the types of
challenges that can be addressed. To our knowledge this
survey represents the first attempt to examine anomaly
detection with a specific focus on social networks. The
contributions of this paper are as follows
• provide an overview of existing challenges in a range
of problem domains associated with online social net-
works that can be addressed using anomaly detection
• provide an overview of existing techniques for anomaly
detection, and the manner in which these have been
applied to social network analysis
• explore future challenges for online social networks,
and the role that anomaly detection can play
• outline key areas where future research can improve
the use of anomaly detection techniques in SNA
In drafting this review we did not set out to consider
particular problem domains. Rather, we aimed to iden-
tify tools specifically designed for detection of anomalies,
regardless of the particular social networks they were de-
signed to analyse. However, as we conducted our survey
we found that relevant work was predominantly published
in the area of computer science, and consequently, many
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of the applications of anomaly detection that we encoun-
tered were focused on anomalies in online systems. There-
fore, unless specifically stated otherwise, the term social
network will be used throughout this paper to mean an
online social network.
Within the social sciences literature, we found a num-
ber of papers focusing on the concept of network change
(see for example McCulloh and Carley (2011); Arney and Arney
(2013); Tambayong (2014)), which attempts to charac-
terise the evolution of social networks. We see anomaly de-
tection as being a subset of of change detection, as anomaly
detection could be used to identify change points where an
evolving social network undergoes a rapid change, however
a network that evolves in a consistent fashion over an ex-
tended period of time is unlikely to be deemed anomalous.
We have therefore elected to limit the scope of our review
to those methods that deal specifically with anomaly de-
tection.
2. Related Work
Previous reviews of anomaly detection have provided
an overview of the general, non-network based problem,
describing the use of various algorithms and the particu-
lar types of problems to which these algorithms are most
suited (Hodge and Austin, 2004; Chandola et al., 2009; Markou and Singh,
2003b,a). A workshop on the detection of network based
anomalies was also held at ACM 2013 (Akoglu and Faloutsos,
2013). The most recent review of general anomaly detec-
tion (Chandola et al., 2009), expands on previous works to
define six categories of anomaly detection techniques; clas-
sification (supervised learning), clustering, nearest neigh-
bour, statistical, information theoretic, and spectral anal-
ysis.
As well as categorising anomaly detection techniques,
previous reviews describe a number of challenges for anomaly
detection, mainly associated with the problem of defining
normal behaviour, particularly in the face of evolving sys-
tems, or systems where anomalies result from malicious ac-
tivities (Chandola et al., 2009; Hodge and Austin, 2004).
In particular, Chandola et al. (2009) note that the devel-
opment of general solutions to anomaly detection remains
a significant challenge and that novel methods are often
developed to solve specific problems, accommodating the
specific requirements of these problems and the specific
representation of the underlying systems. As discussed in
Section 7, this has also been the case for some methods
focused on anomaly detection in social networks.
In addition to the major reviews of anomaly detection
described above, other works have considered anomaly de-
tection as part of methodological surveys for particular
problem domains. For example, methods for performing
anomaly detection have been discussed as part of more
general reviews in areas of fraud detection (Bolton and Hand,
2002; Phua et al., 2010), network intrusion (Jyothsna et al.,
2011; Gogoi et al., 2011; Patcha and Park, 2007), and the
deployment of wireless sensor networks (Zhang et al., 2010;
Janakiram et al., 2006). While significant overlap exists
between the analysis of computer and sensor networks and
social networks, there are also a number of differences that
must be taken into account. In particular, social networks
are typically composed of many inter-connected commu-
nities, which has important consequences for the distri-
bution of node degree, and the transitivity of the net-
work (Newman and Park, 2003). Moreover, anomaly de-
tection in both sensor and computer networks is typically
required to occur online in (soft) real-time, and while this
constraint may also apply in some SNA scenarios, it is
not typically required. In addition, anomaly detection in
sensor networks generally requires algorithms that reduce
network traffic and have a low computational complexity
(Zhang et al., 2010).
3. Problem domains for the application of anomaly
detection in social networks
Anomalies in social networks are often representative
of illegal and unwanted behaviour. The recent explosion of
social media and online social systems, means that many
social networks have become key targets for malicious in-
dividuals attempting to illegally profit from, or otherwise
cause harm to, the users of these systems.
Many users of online social systems such as Facebook,
Google+, Twitter, etc. are regularly subjected to a bar-
rage of spam and otherwise offensive material (Shrivastava et al.,
2008; Fire et al., 2012; Akoglu et al., 2010; Hassanzadeh et al.,
2012). Moreover, the relative anonymity and the unsuper-
vised nature of interaction in many online systems pro-
vides a means for sexual predators to engage with young,
vulnerable individuals (Fire et al., 2012). Since the perpe-
trators of these behaviours often display patterns of inter-
action that are quite different from regular users, they can
be identified through the application of anomaly detection
techniques. For example, sexual predators often interact
with a set of individuals who are otherwise unconnected,
leading to the formation of star like structures (Fire et al.,
2012). These types of structures can be identified by ex-
amining a range of network features (Akoglu et al., 2010;
Shrivastava et al., 2008; Hassanzadeh et al., 2012), or through
the use of trained classifiers (Fire et al., 2012).
Online retailers and online auctions have also become
a key target for malicious individuals. By subverting the
reputation systems of online auction systems, fraudsters
are able to masquerade as honest users, fooling buyers into
paying for expensive goods that are never delivered. This
process is facilitated by the use of Sybil attacks (the use
of multiple fake accounts) and through collaboration be-
tween fraudulent individuals to artificially boost reputa-
tion to a point where honest buyers are willing to partici-
pate in large transactions (Chau et al., 2006; Pandit et al.,
2007). In many online stores, opinion spam, in the form of
fake product reviews, is used in an attempt to distort con-
sumers’ perceptions of product quality and to influence
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buyer behaviour (Akoglu et al., 2013). Again, the mali-
cious individuals who engage in these types of behaviour
often form anomalous structures within the network, as
their patterns of interaction can be quite different from
regular users.
In addition to the social networks supported by ded-
icated online systems, mining of the social networks in-
duced by mobile phone communications, financial trans-
actions, etc. can also be used to identify illegal activities.
Detection of anomalies in these types of networks have pre-
viously been used to identify organised criminal behaviour,
including insurance fraud (S˘ubelj et al., 2011), and ter-
rorist activities (Reid et al., 2005; Krebs, 2002). Given
the highly detrimental impact of these types of behaviour,
anomaly detection in social networks can be seen as an
extremely important component in the growing tool-box
for performing social network analysis (SNA).
Outside of criminal or malicious behaviour, anomaly
detection has also been used to detect important and in-
fluential individuals (Shetty and Adibi, 2005), individuals
fulfilling particular roles within a community (Welser et al.,
2011), levels of community participation (Bird et al., 2008),
and unusual patterns in email traffic (Eberle and Holder,
2007).
4. Definitions
Anomalies are typically defined in terms of deviation
from some expected behaviour. A recent review of general,
non-network based anomaly detection defined anomalies
as “patterns in data that do not conform to a well defined
notion of normal behaviour” (Chandola et al., 2009). An-
other recent review defines anomalies as “an observation
(or subset of observations) which appears to be inconsis-
tent with the remainder of that set of data” ((Barnett and Lewis,
1994), cited in (Hodge and Austin, 2004)). We note two
important aspects of these definitions.
First, the definitions given above highlight the impor-
tance of defining expected behaviour, but are somewhat
imprecise in terms of exactly how the anomaly deviates
from this expectation. This imprecision stems from the
fact that the magnitude of any deviation will depend on
the specific problem domain (Chandola et al., 2009).
Second, these definitions presuppose an understanding
of what exactly should be observed in order to differentiate
normal and anomalous behaviour. In order to detect real-
life behaviour of interest we must observe the underlying
system through a suitable set of features, and determining
which features will provide the greatest separation of nor-
mal and anomalous behaviour is in itself a key challenge
in anomaly detection (Chandola et al., 2009). This can be
especially difficult in adversarial problem domains as the
behaviour of anomalous entities may change over time in
direct response to the detection methods employed.
For the detection of anomalies in social networks, we
are concerned with the pattern of interactions between the
individuals in the network. Thus, following (Chandola et al.,
2009; Hodge and Austin, 2004) we define network anoma-
lies simply as patterns of interaction that significantly dif-
fer from the norm. As is the case for general anomaly de-
tection, this definition is highly imprecise, and for a given
domain, the specific meaning of ‘pattern of interaction’ and
‘significantly differ’ will reflect the particular behaviour of
interest. For example, one analysis of emails between em-
ployees of the Enron corporation considered ‘patterns of
interaction’ to simply be the number of emails sent by
an individual over a given period of time (Priebe et al.,
2005). For this particular study, this metric was deemed
to be a suitable feature for identifying the real-life anoma-
lous behaviour of interest. However, for a different study,
concerned with a different aspect of employee behaviour,
a different metric may be considered in order to capture
the appropriate ‘patterns of interaction’.
In this paper, we focus on the detection of anoma-
lies resulting from patterns of interaction that differ from
normal behaviour within the same social network. How-
ever, for completeness, we note here that another form of
anomaly exists, termed horizontal anomalies (Gao et al.,
2013). Horizontal anomalies occur when the character-
istics or behaviours of an entity vary depending on the
source of the data (Gao et al., 2013; Papadimitriou et al.,
2010). For example, a user of social media may have a
similar set of friends or followers across a number of plat-
forms (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, etc.), but for one particular
platform (Google+ for example) has a markedly different
set of acquaintances. Methods for detecting this type of
anomaly are beyond the scope of this paper. However,
given the highly diverse nature of the systems from which
social network data is currently being extracted, we believe
that the detection of horizontal anomalies will become ex-
tremely important in the near future, and suggest that
further research in this area will be extremely fruitful.
5. Characterisation of anomalies
In analysing social networks it is the interactions be-
tween individuals that form the main object of study. Fo-
cus is given to the manner in which interactions between
pairs of individuals influence interactions with and be-
tween other individuals in the system, and the relationship
between these interactions and the attributes of the indi-
viduals involved (see Brandes et al. (2013); Getoor and Diehl
(2005) for discussion of network analysis in general). This
differentiates anomaly detection in social networks from
traditional, non-network based analysis, where individ-
ual’s attributes are assumed to follow some population
level distribution that ignores interactions and the result-
ing relationships between individuals and their peers.
Typically, social networks are represented using a graph
with vertices (nodes) representing individuals (or groups,
companies, etc.) and edges (links, arcs, etc.) between
the vertices representing interactions. In some instances,
nodes may be partitioned into multiple types, and such
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networks can be represented using bipartite (or tripartite,
etc.) graphs.
Depending on the type of analysis being performed,
networks can be characterised as being either static or dy-
namic, and as being labelled or unlabelled. Obviously, dy-
namic networks change over time, with changes occurring
in the pattern of interactions (who interacts with who),
or in the nature of these interactions (how X interacts
with Y). Labelled networks include information regarding
various attributes of both the individuals and their inter-
actions.
It could be argued that all social networks are dynamic,
however it is often useful to analyse social networks as if
they were static. As an example, consider the Enron email
data set (analysed in Priebe et al. (2005); Akoglu et al.
(2010); Eberle and Holder (2007, 2009)), which consists
of a dynamic network, representing the emails sent be-
tween Enron employees between 1998 - 2002. This network
changes over time as different groups of individuals send
and receive emails at different times. If employee A sends
five emails to employee B, a dynamic representation of the
network would track these five emails as links between A
and B occurring only in the appropriate time-steps. If the
properties of each email are considered (e.g. length, sub-
ject, etc.) then the network is treated as being labelled.
By considering a dynamic representation of the network,
Priebe et al. (2005) were able to detect anomalous time-
steps where a particular individual suddenly increased the
number of emails they sent relative to previous time-steps.
In contrast to a dynamic representation of the Enron
network, if consideration is given to the total set of emails
sent by each employee over the full time period, the time
at which each email is sent is no longer deemed important
and the network can be treated as static. In reducing the
network from a dynamic to a static representation, multi-
ple interactions occurring at different points in time may
be combined in some way, and represented by a single link.
This link may be labelled with the number of interactions
it represents, and with some aggregation of the proper-
ties of these interactions (e.g. mean email length), or it
may be that only the fact that an interaction took place
is important, and the network can be treated as being un-
labelled. For example, a static, unlabelled representation
of the Enron email network was used in the analysis by
(Akoglu et al., 2010), where the formation of an anoma-
lous star like structure was identified, indicative of a sin-
gle individual (Ken Lay, a former CEO) sending emails
to large numbers of individuals who were not otherwise
connected (i.e. they did not send emails to one another).
Thus, so long as the information is actually available, a
network can be easily represented in a number of different
ways, depending on the requirements of the analysis.
Exactly how a social network is chosen to be repre-
sented will depend of course on the type of anomalies to be
detected. As with the networks themselves, the anomalies
that occur in social networks can also be characterised as
being dynamic or static, and as labelled or unlabelled. A
dynamic anomaly occurs with respect to previous network
behaviour, while a static anomaly occurs with respect to
the remainder of the network. Labelled anomalies relate
to both network structure and vertex or edge attributes,
while unlabelled anomalies relate only to network struc-
ture (see Akoglu and Faloutsos (2013)).
In addition to the characterisation as dynamic or static
and labelled or unlabelled, anomalies can be further char-
acterised as occurring with respect to a global or local
context and as occurring across a particular network unit,
which we refer to as the minimal anomalous unit. A global
or local context simply describes whether an anomaly oc-
curs relative to the entire network, or relative only to its
close neighbours. For example, an individual’s income
may be globally insignificant (many people have similar
income), however if the income of their friends (defined by
their links within the network) are all significantly higher,
they may be considered a local anomaly (Gao et al., 2010;
Ji et al., 2012). The minimal anomalous unit refers to the
network structure that we consider to be anomalous. If we
are interested in changes made by individuals, a sudden
change in the medium of communication for example, we
might consider a single vertex to be the minimal anoma-
lous unit. However, if we are interested in larger groups
of individuals, perhaps a group of fraudulent individuals
collaborating to boost their reputation in an online auc-
tion system (Pandit et al., 2007), the minimal anomalous
unit of interest scales to that of a sub-network. In this
situation, the behaviour of any given vertex may not be
anomalous, but taken together as a group, the pattern of
communication may be anomalous with respect to other
groups of vertices in the network. Throughout this review,
we will consider how the different approaches to anomaly
detection relate to each of these four characteristics.
6. Methods for anomaly detection
In Section 5, we defined four characteristics that can be
used to categorise anomalies; static or dynamic, labelled
or unlabelled, local or global context, and the minimal
anomalous unit. In this section we outline various ap-
proaches for detecting these different types of anomalies.
In practice we found that characterisation as static or dy-
namic and labelled or unlabelled best differentiates the
various approaches, thus the following section is organised
according to characterisation along these two axes.
Note that we have considered here only methods that
have previously been used to analyse social networks. Net-
work based anomaly detection has been investigated in a
number of additional problem domains including intrusion
detection (Garc´ıa-Teodoro et al., 2009; Gogoi et al., 2011;
Jyothsna et al., 2011), traffic modelling (Shekhar et al., 2001)
and gene regulation (Kim and Gelenbe, 2009; Kim et al.,
2012). However since we are primarily interested in social
networks we have not included these studies in our review.
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6.1. Static unlabelled anomalies
Static, unlabelled anomalies occur when the behaviour
of an individual or group of individuals leads to the forma-
tion of unusual network structures. Because the labels on
edges and vertices are not considered, any information re-
garding the type of interaction, it’s duration, the age of the
individuals involved, etc. is ignored. Only the fact that
the interaction occurred is significant. Thus in order to
detect anomalous behaviour, assumptions must be made
regarding the probability that a given pair of individuals
will interact.
As an example, Shrivastava et al. (2008) noted that
email spam and viral marketing material is typically sent
from a single malicious individual to many targets. Since
the targets are selected at random, they are unlikely to be
connected independently of the malicious individual, and
the resulting network structure will form a star. Based on
this observation, the number of triangles in each ego-net
1 is used to label the subject individual as being either
malicious or innocent, with a low triangle count indicating
a malicious individual. Extensions to this basic approach
have also been used to detect groups of malicious individ-
uals acting in collaboration (Shrivastava et al., 2008).
While Shrivastava et al. (2008) considered star-like struc-
tures to be indicative of malicious behaviour, Akoglu et al.
(2010) demonstrated that both near-stars and near-cliques
may be indicative of anomalous behaviour in social net-
works. Cliques and stars form the extremal values of a
power-law relationship between the number of nodes in
an ego-net and the number of edges (Ne ∝ N
α
v
), thus in
order to detect anomalies, a power-law curve can be fit-
ted to the network, and the residuals analysed for signif-
icant deviance from the expected relationship. This idea
has been applied to numerous properties of the ego-net
(Akoglu et al., 2010; Hassanzadeh et al., 2012), and in a
comparison of various combinations of features, Hassanzadeh et al.
(2012) showed that a power-law relationship between edge
count, and the average betweenness centrality (see Hassanzadeh et al.
(2012) for definitions) of an individual’s ego-net was most
useful in differentiating between normal and anomalous
(near-cliques or near-stars) ego-nets.
Another approach for detecting static, unlabelled anoma-
lies is the use of signal processing techniques. The appli-
cation of signal processing stems from work on graph par-
titioning, and community detection (Miller et al., 2010b;
Newman, 2006), and treats anomalous subgraphs as a sig-
nal embedded in a larger graph, considered to be back-
ground noise. The problem of detecting this anomalous
subgraph is formulated in terms of a hypothesis test (Miller et al.,
2010b,a, 2011a) with
H0: the graph is noise (no anomalous subgraph
exists)
1An ego-net is defined as the subgraph induced by consideration
of a subject and their immediate neighbours
H1: the graph is signal + noise (an anomalous
subgraph is embedded in the graph)
The null hypothesis assumes that the network is generated
by some stochastic process describing the probability that
any pair of nodes will be connected by an edge. Anoma-
lous subgraphs are generated by different underlying pro-
cesses, resulting in a density of edges that differs from
that expected under the null model (Miller et al., 2010b).
Clearly, the degree to which a signal processing approach
can be successfully applied depends on the identification
of suitable null models describing the background graph.
The most basic model of random graphs, the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
model, treats the possibility of an edge between two ver-
tices as an independent Bernoulli trial, so that any given
edge exists with probability p. However, graphs gener-
ated using this process exhibit a Poisson distribution of
vertex degrees, which has been shown to be a poor ap-
proximation of many real world networks. Typically, real
social networks exhibit a much fatter tail than the Poisson
distribution (Newman et al., 2001; Menges et al., 2008).
More sophisticated models, such as the recursive-matrix
model (R-MAT) are able to generate more realistic graphs
with some degree of clustering and non-Poisson degree dis-
tributions (Chakrabarti et al., 2004; Newman et al., 2001;
Menges et al., 2008). However, the selection of a suit-
able model remains a challenge for signal processing ap-
proaches, and further research is required in this area.
6.2. Static labelled anomalies
By considering vertex and edge labels in addition to the
network structure, a context can be defined in which typ-
ical structures may be considered anomalous. Conversely,
the particular combination of edge and vertex labels within
the context defined by a given network structure (say an
ego-net or community) may also be considered anomalous.
In addition to the detection of cliques and stars us-
ing unlabelled properties, Akoglu et al. (2010) also con-
sidered edge labels to detect ‘heavy’ ego-nets, where the
sum over a particular label is disproportionately high rel-
ative to the number of edges. For example, in analysing
donations to US presidential candidates, the Democratic
National Committee were found to have donated a sub-
stantial amount of money, but this money was spread over
only a few candidates, thus the ego-net formed is consid-
ered ‘heavy’. In contrast the Kerry Committee received
a large number of donations, but each donation was for
a small amount. In this example, a bipartite network is
considered (with candidates and donors as the two vertex
types), and the ego-net provides a context in which the re-
ceived or donated amounts may be considered anomalous.
Outside this structure, a series of small or large donations
may be perfectly normal.
Taking a similar view of context, the detection of com-
munity dependent anomalies has been investigated by di-
viding the network into communities based on individu-
als’ patterns of interactions, and then considering the at-
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tributes of the members of each community (Gao et al.,
2010; Ji et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2012; Muller et al., 2013).
Attribute values which would be deemed normal across the
entire network may appear as anomalies within the more
restricted context imposed by the community setting. For
example, Gao et al. (2010) describe a situation where the
patterns of interaction between a particular group of indi-
viduals marks them as a community within a larger net-
work, however one member of this community has a far
lower income than their peers. Globally, this individual’s
income is completely normal, however within the context
provided by the community their income is seen as an
anomaly.
In the realm of spam detection, static labelled anoma-
lies have been used to identify opinion spam in online
product reviews (Akoglu et al., 2013; Chau et al., 2006;
Pandit et al., 2007). These researchers have applied be-
lief propagation to anomaly detection, whereby ‘hidden’
labels assigned to vertices and edges are updated in an it-
erative manner conditionally based on the labels observed
in the system of interest.
As an example of belief propagation, the FraudEagle
algorithm (Akoglu et al., 2013) uses a bipartite graph to
represent reviews of products in an online retail store, with
users forming one set of vertices, and products forming
the other. Edges between users and products represent
product reviews and are signed according to the overall
rating given in the review. The aim of FraudEagle is to
assign a hidden label to each node, with users labelled as
either honest or fraudulent, and products as good or bad.
These labels are assigned based on the observed pattern
of reviews. It is assumed that normal, honest reviewers
will typically give good products positive reviews and bad
products negative reviews, while fraudulent reviewers are
assumed to regularly do the opposite. This assumption is
encoded as a matrix describing the probability of a user
with a hidden label of either honest or fraudulent giving
a positive or negative review of a product whose hidden
label designates it as either good or bad. By iteratively
propagating labels through the network according to these
assumed probabilities (i.e. by applying loopy belief prop-
agation), the system is able to determine those users who
can be considered as opinion spammers.
While not strictly applied to social networks, TrustRank
(Gyo¨ngyi et al., 2004) could also be considered as an ex-
ample of a belief propagation approach to anomaly de-
tection. In TrustRank, trustworthy pages are assumed
to be unlikely to link to spam pages, and given an ini-
tially labelled set of trustworthy pages, trust is propagated
through page out-links, so that those pages within k-steps
of the the initially trusted page are also labelled as trust-
worthy. By ranking pages according to the propagated
trust score, spam pages, representing anomalies, can be
detected.
Another approach to the detection of static labelled
anomalies is the application of information theory, which
provides a set of measures for quantifying the amount of
information described by some event or observation. The
most commonly used measure, entropy, describes the num-
ber of bits required to encode the information associated
with a given event. Thus, given a set of observations O, the
global entropy H(O) can be thought of as a measure of the
degree of randomness or heterogeneity. A set containing
a large number of different observations will require more
bits to store the associated information and will therefore
have a higher global entropy. In contrast a totally ho-
mogeneous set will require relatively few bits to store the
associated information.
In terms of anomaly detection, entropy can be used
to identify those subgraphs that if removed from the net-
work would lead to a significant change in entropy. These
subgraphs may represent important communities or in-
dividuals (Shetty and Adibi, 2005; Tsugawa et al., 2010;
Serin and Balcisoy, 2012), or may represent a normal pat-
tern of behaviour that can then be used as a point of
comparison, with those subgraphs that deviate from this
norm considered to be anomalous (Noble and Cook, 2003;
Eberle and Holder, 2007, 2009). In comparing subgraphs,
an information theoretic approach considers a global con-
text, using a very different representation of the network
than that used in the other approaches described in this
paper. In applying an information theoretic approach, in-
teractions are represented as subgraphs, and values typi-
cally represented as labels on edges or vertices are them-
selves represented as a vertex in this subgraph.
Information theoretic approaches have been shown to
be capable of detecting anomalous interactions based on
complex structures and flows of information. For exam-
ple, a version of this method was applied to the Enron
email data set (Eberle and Holder, 2009), resulting in de-
tection of a single instance of an email being sent from a
director to a non-management employee, and then being
forwarded to another non-management employee. Within
the Enron data set many emails are sent from directors
to non-management employees and between pairs of non-
management employees, but this was the only instance
involving a forwarded email from a director to a non-
management employee. This degree of sensitivity is use-
ful in problem domains consisting of adversarial systems
where individuals actively seek to hide illegal or otherwise
unwanted behaviour, and deviations from the norm are
likely to be small (Eberle and Holder, 2009).
6.3. Dynamic unlabelled anomalies
Dynamic unlabelled anomalies arise when patterns of
interaction change over time, such that the structure of
a network in one time-step differs markedly from that in
previous time-steps. As with static unlabelled anomalies,
there are obviously numerous graph properties that we
may consider, each of which can be used to generate time-
series that can be analysed using traditional tools. Indeed,
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we could go so far as to use a static analysis (e.g. the pa-
rameter of a fitted power-law relationship) as the subject
of a time-series and consider how this value changes over
time. The difficulty lies, of course, in selecting an appro-
priate feature, or set of features, that adequately captures
the real-world behaviour of interest.
Within the literature we found examples of dynamic
unlabelled network analysis using a variety of methods,
including scan statistics (Priebe et al., 2005; Neil et al.,
2011; Cheng and Dickinson, 2013; Marchette, 2012; Park et al.,
2009; McCulloh and Carley, 2011), Bayesian inference (Heard et al.,
2010), auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) models
(Pincombe, 2005), and link prediction (Huang and Zeng,
2006). The use of these methods has mostly focused on
individual nodes, or ego-nets, considering the node degree
or the size of the ego-net.
Link prediction attempts to predict future interactions
between individuals based on previous interactions. In
order to detect anomalies, a link prediction algorithm is
run, and for each pair of individuals in the network, the
likelihood of interaction occurring in the next time-step is
calculated. This predicted likelihood is then compared to
the observed interactions, and those observed interactions
having a low predicted likelihood are deemed anomalous
(Huang and Zeng, 2006).
Using scan statistics, analysis is performed by averag-
ing a time-series over a moving window [t− τ, t] and com-
paring this average to the current time-step. If the differ-
ence is larger than some predefined threshold, the time-
step is considered to be anomalous (Priebe et al., 2005;
Neil et al., 2011; Cheng and Dickinson, 2013; Marchette,
2012; Park et al., 2009). The use of ARMA models in-
volves fitting the model to a time series and considering
the residuals for this fit (see Pincombe (2005)). Those
residuals above a specified cut-off are deemed to represent
anomalous time-steps.
In Bayesian analysis, the generated time series is as-
sumed to follow some distribution (i.e. each time-step rep-
resents a draw from the assumed distribution). Given an
initial estimation of the distribution parameters, a series of
updates can be performed in an iterative manner. For each
time step, the prior distribution is updated by considering
the value at that time step and calculating a posterior dis-
tribution that incorporates the information from all of the
previous time steps. Using this posterior distribution, a
p-value is calculated, giving the probability that the value
at the next time step was drawn from this distribution.
If this p-value is below a significance threshold, the value
can be considered anomalous. The posterior distribution is
then treated as the prior for the next update (Heard et al.,
2010).
The use of scan statistics is the most prominent form
of analysis we found in the literature, and extensions to
the basic form have been suggested that allow correlated
changes in graph properties to be detected (Cheng and Dickinson,
2013). This enables inter-related vertices or subgraphs to
be identified, and may be of benefit in detecting clandes-
tine organisations. Another extension is the application to
hypergraphs (Park et al., 2009), which are a generalisation
of graphs allowing hyperedges that can connect more than
two vertices. Such graphs can be used to represent interac-
tions that involve more than two individuals such as meet-
ings, group emails and text messages, and co-authorship
on research papers (Park et al., 2009; Silva and Willett,
2008).
Other researchers have considered larger structures such
as maximal cliques (Chen et al., 2012), and coronets 2
(Ji et al., 2013), with a view to detecting anomalous evo-
lution of a system at a neighbourhood scale. If we con-
sider only the pattern of interactions between individuals,
a maximal clique can evolve in only six different ways; by
growing, shrinking, merging, splitting, appearing or van-
ishing (Chen et al., 2012). Similarly, a coronet can evolve
only through the insertion or deletion of a node, or the
insertion or deletion of a number of edges. If normal be-
haviour is assumed to result in stable, non-evolving neigh-
bourhoods, then any neighbourhood that undergoes one
of these transformations can be considered to be anoma-
lous. For less stable systems, this idea could obviously be
extended to include consideration of the number of neigh-
bourhoods that change over a time-step, or the magnitude
of this change. In such scenarios, scan-statistics, Bayesian
inference or any other form of time-series analysis may be
employed in order to detect anomalous time-steps.
In addition to the approaches discussed above, there is
a large body of work that focuses on anomaly detection in
time-series in general (see Cheboli (2010); Chandola (2009)
for recent reviews). We believe that these existing methods
could also be used to detect dynamic anomalies in social
networks, assuming that suitable features can be identified
for generating the required time-series. Moreover, sub-
stantial work has been undertaken in the field of change
detection in social networks (e.g. McCulloh and Carley
(2011); Arney and Arney (2013); Tambayong (2014), and
we believe that there is considerable room for cross-over
between these two fields.
6.4. Dynamic labelled anomalies
In conducting our survey, we found dynamic labelled
anomalies to be the least represented in the literature. A
recent paper describes the application of a signal process-
ing approach to anomaly detection in dynamic, labelled
networks (Miller et al., 2013), however this was the only
example we found.
2A coronet is a concept of neighbourhood, where the ‘closeness’
to a subject is defined in terms of the number of interactions that
occur between individuals, rather than simple connectedness. See
(Ji et al., 2013) for a formal definition. Note that the number of
interactions between two individuals is often expressed as a weight,
which could be considered a label on the edge. However, since mul-
tiple interactions can also be represented by multiple edges, we do
not consider this to be a true label.
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Extending the basic signal processing approach used
for static, unlabelled anomalies (Miller et al., 2010b,a), de-
tection of dynamic labelled anomalies assumes that the
probability of an edge occurring between any two nodes
is a function of the the linear combination of node at-
tributes (Miller et al., 2013). Coefficients for this linear
combination are fitted to the network of interest. The
dynamic nature of the network is handled by considering
the network structure in discrete time-steps, and treating
each time-step as for a static network. Comparing the ex-
pected graph to the observed graph in each time-step gives
a residual matrix that can be integrated over a specified
time period using a filter (see Miller et al. (2013, 2011b)
for details). Note that this method assumes the number
of vertices remains constant over the specified time-period,
and that only the edges change.
In addition to the signal processing approach described
above, we suggest that those methods used for detect-
ing dynamic unlabelled anomalies could be adapted for
the detection of dynamic labelled anomalies. We argue
that this type of development will be extremely benefi-
cial as including additional information provided by node
and edge labels is likely to significantly improve anomaly
detection, providing additional dimensions for separating
normal and anomalous behaviour. For example, a recent
study demonstrated that link prediction can be signifi-
cantly improved by including topic information from users
tweets (Rowe et al., 2012). Obviously if the algorithm
used to predict links is improved, any anomaly detection
using this algorithm will also be improved.
As with dynamic unlabelled anomalies, we also sug-
gest that existing methods for time-series analysis can be
applied to the detection of dynamic labelled anomalies. A
number of methods for detecting anomalies within discrete
sequences are discussed in (Chandola et al., 2012), and we
believe that many of these methods could be applied to
the detection of dynamic labelled anomalies in social net-
works.
7. Discussion
In this paper we have surveyed a small but growing
number of solutions to detecting anomalies in online social
networks. While these approaches differ in their treatment
of the network, considering dynamic or static representa-
tions and including or ignoring node attributes, they are
all based primarily on the analysis of interactions between
individuals. It is this basis that differentiates the detec-
tion of anomalies in social networks form other forms of
anomaly detection.
Note that while anomalies and networks can be charac-
terised as static or dynamic, labelled or unlabelled etc., the
various approaches to anomaly detection can, of course,
also be grouped by the types of algorithms employed and
also the problem domain they were originally developed
to address. In conducting our survey, we found it quite
interesting that the partitioning of detection methods by
algorithm type very nearly matches the partition induced
by the authorship of related literature. During our re-
view, we found very little crossover between the different
research groups exploring this area, with each group tend-
ing to focus on a single or limited number of approaches.
Certainly, we did not find clear lines of development, where
a particular approach has evolved through incremental im-
provements over a large number of iterations. Clearly, this
reflects the young nature of this field, and we anticipate
that this state of affairs will change significantly over the
next decade.
In considering how the various approaches presented in
the literature apply to different types of network anoma-
lies, we found that the methods used to actually detect
anomalies, as opposed to calculating network features, is
largely independent of the type of anomaly being detected.
Once a suitable feature space has been identified and cal-
culated, it is often the case that any number of traditional
anomaly detection techniques could be applied. For exam-
ple, in Section 6.1 (static unlabelled anomalies), we dis-
cuss the use of regression to detect anomalous ego-nets
displaying an unusual edge count relative to node count
(Akoglu et al., 2010). However, rather than applying re-
gression, once the edge count - node count feature space is
extracted, an alternative anomaly detection method, such
as a nearest neighbour method, could just as easily have
been applied. Therefore, we argue that the process of de-
tecting anomalies in social networks is composed of two
quite separable sub-processes; namely, the calculation of
a suitable feature space, and the detection of anomalies
within this space. Moreover, we argue that the selection
of a suitable feature space can be further broken down so
that, taking a high level view of the problem, the vast ma-
jority of the approaches we reviewed can be generalised
into the following five steps.
1. Determine the smallest unit affected by the behaviour
of interest (node, neighbourhood, community, etc).
2. Identify the particular properties of this unit that
are expected to deviate from the norm.
3. Identify the context in which these deviations are
expected to occur.
4. Calculate the properties of interest, extracting a fea-
ture space in which the distances between observa-
tions can be measured and compared in a meaningful
way.
5. Within this space, calculate distances between obser-
vations, possibly applying traditional (non-network)
tools for anomaly detection (e.g. clustering, nearest
neighbour analysis etc.).
In each of the papers we surveyed we found something
akin to the five steps given above. Obviously there is a
major focus on step 4, as the naive approach to this step
is often computationally expensive. Given the size of many
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online social networks, and the demand for tools to handle
Big Data we see the development of scalable anomaly de-
tection solutions as being an extremely important area of
research. However, we also see the selection of a suitable
feature space (steps 1 - 3) as being equally important.
We believe that our steps 1 - 3, which encompass the
mapping of real-world behaviours of interest to suitable
feature spaces, form a key challenge for detecting anoma-
lies in social networks. In conducting our survey, few of the
papers we reviewed explicitly described how the mapping
between the behaviour of interest and the network prop-
erties considered was performed. Those few papers that
did (e.g. Akoglu et al. (2013); Shrivastava et al. (2008);
Friedland (2009); Gao et al. (2010); Ji et al. (2013)), clearly
explained the combination of domain knowledge and math-
ematical reasoning that underpin the use of a particular
approach and the examination particular network features.
For the majority of papers though, the reasons for con-
sidering a particular set of features were unclear, and in
many examples the real-world behaviour giving rise to any
anomalies detected was discussed only in response to the
anomaly actually being found, rather than as a motiva-
tion for using a particular approach. We believe that this
is problematic as many of the approaches we reviewed were
tested only on a single, or a limited number of data sets,
and may therefore be biased towards the particular anoma-
lies inherent in those data sets. Without explicit reasoning
as to why a particular behaviour should be identifiable by a
particular anomalous network feature there is no reason to
suspect that this feature will behave in a particular man-
ner across different data sets, representing different social
networks.
The lack of papers clearly describing the reasons for
examining a particular set of features suggests to us that
selection of a suitable feature space may be extremely dif-
ficult in practice. Many properties of social networks are
correlated in some fashion, and it is not clear which combi-
nations of features can be used to capture orthogonal con-
cepts. Some comparison of feature spaces has been under-
taken (e.g. Hassanzadeh et al. (2012); McCulloh and Carley
(2011)), however such comparisons have been restricted in
the number of features considered, and the types of anoma-
lies being detected. We predict that the requirements for
anomaly detection in social networks will rapidly advance
in the near future, with ever larger volumes of data and in-
creasingly complex behaviours being considered. This may
in turn lead to the consideration of increasingly complex
feature spaces. Thus the development of any guidelines
or heuristics for mapping real-world behaviour to appro-
priate feature spaces will be of benefit. One possibility
that we see for identifying suitable feature spaces is the
application of a shotgun approach. By applying multiple
detection techniques across numerous graph properties, it
may be possible to identify mechanistic links between the
actual behaviours of interest and resulting changes in net-
work properties, and to determine those features that best
differentiate anomalous and normal behaviours.
Another major challenge for detecting anomalies in on-
line social networks is the evaluation and comparison of
different methods. Clearly, not all algorithms are univer-
sally applicable, and many of the existing approaches have
been developed with specific problem domains and data
formats in mind. Moreover, there is a distinct lack of pub-
licly available data sets with known ground truths. In or-
der to compare existing and novel techniques, it is impor-
tant to consider how accuracy (recall) and precision are in-
fluenced by the scale of the analysis, the density of anoma-
lies, and the magnitude of difference between anomalous
and normal observations. However, the range of differ-
ent data sets required to perform such comparisons is not
currently available. Thus many approaches are tested on
a single data set, with verification of results performed
for the top ranked anomalies using manual investigation.
For example, Pandit et al. (2007) analyse transactions in
an online auction system, and in order to test their ap-
proach results were ranked according to an anomaly score.
The top-ranked user accounts were then manually investi-
gated by checking the auction website for complaints made
against these accounts. This type of manual investiga-
tion is highly time-consuming and highly dependent on
the level of reporting by the owners of the target system.
In many cases, manual investigation of user accounts in
this way is impossible.
Some data sets do exist that are relatively well charac-
terised, including the Enron email data set and to a lesser
extent the Paraiso communication (synthetic, VAST 2008,
www.cs.umd.edu/hcil/VASTchallenge08/). Anomalies de-
tected within these data sets can be easily verified against
the known series of events. However these data sets are
relatively small, and may only be suitable for a small sub-
set of problem domains. Therefore, in order to address
this challenge, we believe that the generation of synthetic
data sets is a logical course of action.
A number of methods for generating random social net-
works have been proposed, ranging from simple models as-
suming some global probability that a given pair of nodes
will be connected to more complex models considering the
dynamics of each individual node Menges et al. (2008).
Between these two extremes lies a broad spectrum of mod-
els that have been developed over time and thus reflect our
growing understanding of the general properties of social
networks (e.g. high transitivity, positive, assortivity, pres-
ence of community structures). Consequently, early mod-
els (reviewed by Chakrabarti and Faloutsos (2006), see also
Sallaberry et al. (2013)) capture only a small number of
what we now consider to be general properties of social
networks Akoglu and Faloutsos (2009), while more recent
models (e.g. Akoglu and Faloutsos (2009); Sallaberry et al.
(2013)) are able to reproduce far more realistic represen-
tations of a wide range of social networks. As an exam-
ple, Akoglu and Faloutsos (2009) describe eleven proper-
ties of social networks which they suggest should be re-
produced by random network generators and provide a
suitable method for generation that does indeed repro-
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duce these properties. This method is reported to be
highly flexible, and can be used to generate weighted or un-
weighted, directed or undirected and unipartite or bipar-
tite networks. The method has since been applied in the
testing of a novel anomaly detection method, being used
to generate a bipartite network representing user reviews
of online products in an e-commerce setting (Akoglu et al.,
2013) (a method for generating these types of networks is
also described as part of the Berlin SPARQL Benchmark
http://wifo5-03.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/bizer/berlinsparqlbenchmark,
last accessed May, 2014).
The vast majority of network generation methods pro-
posed to date can be described as phenomenological in na-
ture. While these methods are able to reproduce many of
the known properties of social networks, they do so with-
out describing the underlying mechanisms that cause these
properties to arise. In contrast, agent-based models (alter-
natively, individual-based models) such as that proposed
by Menges et al. (2008) (see also Glasser and Lindauer (2013);
Hummel et al. (2012)) describe the specific actions taken
by individuals in the underlying system that lead to the
formation of a social network. In this type of simulation,
the macro-level properties of the resulting social network
can be seen as emergent properties stemming from the
micro-level behaviour of the underlying agent-based sys-
tem. The model does not explicitly set out to reproduce
these properties, but rather to represent the behaviour of
the individuals involved. In the course of representing this
behaviour, the model reproduces a realistic social network.
We believe that this approach has great potential for gen-
erating realistic data sets and represents an extremely in-
teresting area of research, particularly in adversarial prob-
lem domains where anomalous agents could attempt to
disguise their behaviour by mimicking ’normal’ agents.
In this paper we have surveyed a number of approaches
for detecting anomalies in online social networks. We
found that these different approaches can be usefully cat-
egorised based on characterisation of anomalies as being
static or dynamic and labelled or unlabelled. Depending
on this characterisation, different features of the network
may be examined, and we have suggested that the selec-
tion of appropriate features is a highly non-trivial task. We
believe that as the requirements of social network analysis
continue to grow, the challenges inherent in Big Data anal-
ysis will necessitate sophisticated heuristics and algorithms
for mapping complex behaviours to network features, and
scalable solutions for calculating rich feature spaces which
can be subjected to anomaly detection analysis.
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